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Introduction
This chapter presents a critical case study of unlawful metadata access and retroactive crimi-
nalization of encryption to persecute perceived dissidents by focusing on ByLock prosecutions 
in Turkey. Although ByLock was a public and free encrypted mobile chat application, the 
Turkish government argues that ByLock was exclusively used by the members of the Gulen 
Movement (GM), which the Turkish government accuses of organizing the failed coup attempt 
against President Erdogan in 2016. Under post-coup measures, tens of thousands of alleged 
ByLock users have been arrested under GM probe and handed down heavy prison sentences 
on terrorism charges. This chapter aims to highlight the threat of 'bad data' practices, such as 
criminalization of encryption, unlawful data access and abuse of communications metadata 
to persecute perceived dissidents, by unpicking the Turkish state's claims and the evidence 
presented to courts by the Turkish state during the ByLock trials. By doing so, this chapter 
contributes to current metadata retention and lawful access debate by detailing material 
effects of metadata exploitation for political purposes by government authorities. This chapter 
contends that lessons learned from the ByLock case illustrate how critical 'Good Data' princi-
ples and the integrity of encrypted and secure communication channels are for democracies.
Digital communication technologies (DCTs) have altered the way we generate, share and 
receive information. For the most part, DCTs have made public and private communications 
faster, cheaper, and easier. Although these advancements have been beneficial for people 
in general, DCTs have introduced new threats to privacy and information security. As the 
Snowden leaks revealed, DCT infrastructures have enabled state actors to access 'bulk' digital 
communications data and increased the surveillance capabilities of state actors exponentially.1 
Dissidents, minority populations and activists have been disproportionally affected by the 
increased digital surveillance efforts of state actors.2
In the age of DCTs, many fundamental rights essential for a 'Good Democracy' - such as the 
freedom of expression, the freedom of political thought, the freedom of religion, the freedom 
of association, and the right to privacy - are dependent on having strong information security. 
Freedom of expression is defined as the 'freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
1 Lina Dencik, Arne Hintz, and Jonathan Cable, 'Towards Data Justice? The Ambiguity of Anti-
Surveillance Resistance in Political Activism,' Big Data & Society 3.2 (2016), DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1177/f2053951716679678.
2 G Greenwald and R Gallagher, 'Snowden Documents Reveal Covert Surveillance and Pressure Tactics 
Aimed at WikiLeaks and Its Supporters' The Intercept, 2014, https://theintercept.com/2014/02/18/
snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/.
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information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers' in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR).3 In order to have a 'Good 
Democracy', activists, dissidents, or people in general need to be able to communicate 
securely to enjoy the freedom 'to receive and impart information without interference by 
public authority'.4 Therefore, 'Good Data' and counter-surveillance practices such as online 
anonymity and encryption tools are integral to having a 'Good Democracy'. Since encryption 
is an essential tool to secure DCTs from state surveillance, encrypted and secure communi-
cation platforms frequently come under the attack by states, citing national security concerns.5 
These attacks constitute 'bad data' practices because they involve attempts to pass backdoor 
legislation, unlawfully spying on dissidents, activists and NGOs such as Privacy International,6 
and the use of unlawfully acquired or manipulated (meta)data to prosecute and/or persecute 
government critics.
To illustrate the oppressive potentials of 'bad data' practices, I introduce a case study of mass 
persecution of perceived government critics over their alleged usage of an encrypted commu-
nication application called ByLock in Turkey. ByLock was a free and public chat application 
which was downloaded more than 500,000 times from the App Store and Google Play Store 
between April 2014 and March 2016,7 when it was deactivated when its developers stopped 
paying for the servers hosting the app.8 Turkish Intelligence Agency (in Turkish Millî Istihbarat 
Teşkilatı, henceforth MIT) claimed that ByLock was a secret communication tool for Gulen 
Movement (henceforth GM) members - a social movement that the Turkish government holds 
responsible for the failed coup against Erdogan in 2016. In the aftermath of the coup attempt, 
the Turkish government accused any individual with perceived links to GM of being 'terrorists' 
and started an unprecedented purge. Shortly after the coup attempt, Turkish media reported 
that the MIT had hacked ByLock's servers in Lithuania, in an attempt to uncover ByLock users, 
perceived to be Gulenists.9 MIT further claimed that they had identified thousands of ByLock 
users via metadata provided by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Mobile Network Oper-
ators (MNOs). Although the number of individuals ensnared under the ByLock investigation 
has not been officially released, Freedom House reported that 'Tens of thousands of Turkish 
citizens have been arbitrarily detained for their alleged use of the encrypted communications 
app ByLock'.10 Mass arrests based on alleged ByLock usage have attracted severe criticism 
outside Turkey. The UN Human Rights Council called ByLock prosecutions a 'criminalization 
3 European Union, 'Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,' 2012, 391-407, https://doi.
org/10.1108/03090550310770974.
4 Ibid.
5 David Lyon, Surveillance After Snowden, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015.
6 Privacy International, 'Press Release: UK Intelligence Agency Admits Unlawfully Spying on Privacy 
International | Privacy International,' 2018, https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/2283/press-
release-uk-intelligence-agency-admits-unlawfully-spying-privacy.
7 Fox-IT, 'Expert Witness Report on ByLock Investigation', Delft, 2017, https://foxitsecurity.files.wordpress.
com/2017/09/bylock-fox-it-expert-witness-report-english.pdf.
8 Yasir Gokce, 'The Bylock Fallacy: An In-Depth Analysis of the Bylock Investigations in Turkey,' Digital 
Investigation (March, 2018): 2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2018.06.002.
9 Freedom House, 'Freedom on the Net 2017 Report,' 2017, 15, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/
files/FOTN 2017_Turkey.pdf.
10 Ibid, 14.
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of encryption', noting that the 'evidence presented [by Turkish authorities] is often ambigu-
ous'.11 Amnesty International (AI) criticized ByLock prosecutions by stating that 'possession 
of internationally available and widely downloaded application does not represent a criminal 
offence' and the 'Turkish Government's methods for identifying users are seriously flawed in 
general'.12 Similarly, Privacy International condemned the ByLock prosecutions and called 
for the immediate release of those arrested solely for using ByLock.13
Drawing on Cohen's moral panic theory,14 I conduct a critical analysis of the post-coup mea-
sures taken by the Turkish regime, especially focusing on evidence cited in ByLock prose-
cutions. I conclude that the abuse of metadata to punish political enemies is not necessarily 
limited to authoritarian governments such as Turkey, as metadata are retained globally. By 
doing so, I present a cautionary case study from Turkey, detailing material effects of meta-
data exploitation for political purposes by government authorities, which digital activists and 
scholars around the world can draw on in the metadata retention and lawful access debates.15 
I argue that the abuse of metadata and unscrupulous law-enforcement powers can be easily 
justified in 'moral panics' when 'a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to 
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests'.16 I further argue that, supranation-
al human rights legislation may be ineffective to prevent state surveillance, privacy breaches 
and metadata abuse. Finally, I contend that lessons learned from the ByLock case illustrate 
the importance of the 'Good Data' practices and the integrity of DCTs for 'good democracy'.
Digital Communication Technologies, Metadata and State 
Access
Before the emergence of DCTs, mass communication and public information campaigns 
were conducted through pre-digital information sharing mechanisms (ISMs) such as print 
media, radio, and television. Because of the nation-state-led developments in the technolog-
ical infrastructure they relied on, pre-digital ISMs were relatively easier to influence for states 
and the powerful.17 With the emergence of the internet and the DCTs, some scholars and 
11 UN Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression on His Mission to Turkey' (A/HRC/35/22/Add.3, 2017), 14, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/59394c904.html.
12 Amnesty International, 'BRIEFING: Prosecution Of 11 Human Rights Defenders,' 2017, 7, https://www.
amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4473292017ENGLISH.pdf.
13 Privacy International, 'Encryption At The Centre Of Mass Arrests : One Year On From Turkey's Failed 
Coup,' Privacy International, 2017, https://medium.com/@privacyint/encryption-at-the-centre-of-mass-
arrests-one-year-on-from-turkeys-failed-coup-e6ecd0ef77c9.
14 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, third edition, 
London/New York: Routledge, 2002.
15 Amory Starr et al, 'The Impacts of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-
Legal Analysis', Qualitative Sociology 31.3 (2008): 251-70, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-008-
9107-z. ; Lisa M. Austin, 'Lawful Illegality: What Snowden Has Taught Us About the Legal Infrastructure 
of the Surveillance State,' SSRN (2014), DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2524653.
16 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, 282:1.
17 Hannu Nieminen, 'Digital Divide and beyond: What Do We Know of Information and Communications 
Technology's Long-Term Social Effects? Some Uncomfortable Questions', European Journal of 
Communication 31.1 (2016): 19-32, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323115614198.
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activists argued that these new media provided an opportunity to overcome some of the above 
challenges. One of the primary arguments brought forward was that the internet provided 
a decentralized infrastructure that allowed active participation of individuals online, which, 
in turn had the potential to disturb the pre-digital ISMs.18 When equipped with 'Good Data' 
principles, DCTs provided a window of opportunity for activists and dissidents to revolutionize 
public and private communications. For instance, during the Arab Spring protests, online 
social media networks served as 'a common medium for professional journalism and citizen 
journalism, and as a site of global information flow' which, allowed activists to overcome 
state blackout and 'facilitating the revolutions'.19 The revolutionary aspect of DCTs led some 
to believe - perhaps naively - that DCTs could provide users with an opportunity to become 
anonymous and protected from intrusive state surveillance. Current political, legal, and aca-
demic debates, however, illustrates that this is not the case.
One of the primary debates around DCTs concerns the retention of metadata and risks to 
user privacy.20 In the context of DCTs, metadata are information about communications that 
users leave behind while using DCTs. For instance, while contents of the visited webpages 
are data, IP access logs and timestamps stored by ISPs are metadata. All user activities on 
DCTs, such as phone conversations, search queries, emails, website visits, ad-clicks, social 
media activities, and peer-to-peer messages, generate metadata which can be logged and 
stored automatically. Riley called this perennial form of large scale (meta)data collection 
'dataveillance'.21 Metadata can be aggregated, analyzed and sold to third parties. Using meta-
data, users can be profiled based on their political leanings, ethnic background, and sexual 
orientation. Inferences drawn from (meta)data analyses can be used for anti-democratic pur-
poses, such as election meddling, as observed in the Cambridge Analytica case.22 Metadata 
expand the surveillance capacities of state actors by revealing personal information such as 
'who', 'when', 'what (type of communication)', 'how', 'where' which, in turn, 'can provide very 
detailed information regarding an individual's beliefs, preferences and behaviour'.23 In fact, in 
the Big Brother Watch vs UK ruling, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that 
'metadata can be just as intrusive as the interception of content'.24  Considering nation states 
are actively trying to exploit DCTs using both legal and illegal means,25 the ease of access to 
18 Peter Ferdinand, 'The Internet, Democracy and Democratization', Democratization 7.1 (2000): 1-17, 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340008403642.
19 Gilad Lotan et al, 'The Arab Spring| The Revolutions Were Tweeted: Information Flows during the 2011 
Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions,' International Journal of Communication 5 (2011): 1377.
20 Monique Mann et al., 'The Limits of (Digital) Constitutionalism: Exploring the Privacy-Security (Im)
Balance in Australia,' International Communication Gazette (in press, 2018), DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1177/1748048518757141.
21 Rita Raley, 'Dataveilance and Countervailance' in in L Gitelman, Raw Data' Is an Oxymoron, Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press, 2013.
22 CNBC, 'Facebook-Cambridge Analytica: A Timeline of the Data Hijacking Scandal,' 2018, https://www.
cnbc.com/2018/04/10/facebook-cambridge-analytica-a-timeline-of-the-data-hijacking-scandal.html.
23 Nora Ni Loideain, 'EU Law and Mass Internet Metadata Surveillance in the Post-Snowden Era,' Media 
and Communication 3.2 (2015): 54, DOI: https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v3i2.297.
24 M Milanovic, 'ECtHR Judgment in Big Brother Watch v. UK,' EJIL:Talk!, 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/
ecthr-judgment-in-big-brother-watch-v-uk/.
25 Amnesty International, 'Encryption. A Matter of Human Rights,' 2016, http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/
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metadata can be especially dangerous for political activists, dissident groups and perceived 
political opponents, who are subject to disproportionate and intrusive state surveillance.26
To date, national and supranational legal mechanisms have failed to provide comprehensive 
privacy protection for individuals. Governments around the world increasingly pass new laws 
that require metadata retention based on the argument of public security, pre-empting crime 
and terrorism.27 Even in the EU context, where mechanisms such as CFR, ECtHR and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provide a supranational level of legal protection 
against human rights breaches,28 it is hard to talk about sufficient legal protection against 
government efforts to breach user privacy. For instance, the UK Government passed the 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) which required DCT providers 
to retain indiscriminate metadata on the grounds of national security and crime prevention. 
Both the Divisional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that 
DRIPA was incompatible with EU law.29 In a subsequent joint case ruling, CJEU found that 
the mass collection and analysis of metadata would lead to the violation of Article 7 [Respect 
to private and family life] and Article 8 [Protection of personal data] of the CFR, 'which could 
be justified only by the objective of fighting serious crime'.30 Even though privacy organizations 
and activists welcomed this ruling, the CJEU left it to Member States to define what consti-
tutes serious crime, hence the ability to adjust the balance of privacy versus national security. 
Indeed, in December 2016, the UK government replaced DRIPA with the Investigatory Powers 
Act which replicated the problematic elements of the DRIPA i.e. requirement for metadata 
retention and broad access by government agencies, even on non-crime related grounds.
Moral Panics and the Abuse of Metadata
To understand the true risks of metadata retention, it is beneficial to look at cases where 
authoritarian regimes exploit communications metadata to target political enemies and to 
facilitate oppression of dissidents - this is the focus of my analysis. In most cases, oppression 
faced by dissidents is a perennial process. Historical oppression of Kurds by the Turkish 
state and successive governments from different political backgrounds is a prime example 
of the continual oppression observed by dissidents.31 However, in some cases, new political 
opponents can become targets. The latter is better observed within moral panics emerging 
default/files/encryption_-_a_matter_of_human_rights_-_pol_40-3682-2016.pdf.
26 Marcus Michaelsen, 'Exit and Voice in a Digital Age: Iran's Exiled Activists and the Authoritarian State', 
Globalizations 15.2 (2018): 248-64, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2016.1263078.
27 UN Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye,' Human Rights Council (A/HRC/29/32: UN 
Human Rights Council, 2015).
28 The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is not included here - despite being the most 
recent and comprehensive legislation which aims to protect user privacy - since its effectiveness in 
practice remains to be seen.
29 Isabella Buono and Aaron Taylor, 'Mass Surveillance in the CJEU: Forging a European Consensus', The 
Cambridge Law Journal 76.2 (2017): 250-53, DOI: https://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S0008197317000526.
30 Ibid, 251.
31 William Gourlay, 'Oppression, Solidarity, Resistance: The Forging of Kurdish Identity in Turkey', 
Ethnopolitics 17.2 (2018): 130-46, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2017.1339425.
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in the aftermath of political upheavals.
Goode and Ben-Yehuda's attributional model provides a useful theoretical perspective for 
understanding moral panics.32 They propose five defining 'elements of criteria' i.e. concern, 
hostility, consensus, disproportion and volatility for moral panics. Authoritarian regimes are 
adept at constructing and propagating a 'folk devil' narrative to rationalize the persecution of 
political enemies and dissidents. These oppressive efforts increase when moral panics emege. 
Folk-devil narratives, constructed by authoritarian regimes, take advantage of widespread 
public concerns 'over the behaviour of a certain group or category'.33 Concerns may be latent 
in society or be volatile i.e. surfacing suddenly following political upheavals. An example of 
the latter would be socially disruptive incidents, such as terror attacks, which act as 'trigger 
events',34 and result in a 'heightened level of concern over the behaviour of a certain group or 
category.35 In the aftermath of trigger events, the public becomes susceptible to be influenced 
by constructed folk devil narratives and 'an increased level of hostility' towards targeted groups 
may be observed.36 Actively propagating 'folk devil' narratives may result in partial or complete 
consensus that 'the threat is real, serious and caused by the wrongdoing group members and 
their behaviour' across society.37 Once there is a consensus of hostility towards the folk devils, 
disproportionate social and official reactions may be observed. Furthermore, disproportionate 
reactions may become 'routinized or institutionalized', 38 and lead to impulsive and reactionary 
changes in 'legislation, enforcement practices, informal interpersonal norms or practices for 
punishing transgressors'.39 As a result, overreactions can even be more damaging than the 
original threat for the public.
Correspondingly, abuse of communications metadata to confer criminality upon political 
enemies and dissidents can be easily justified following trigger events. As UNHRC Special 
Rapporteur David Kaye warned, 'efforts to restrict encryption and anonymity also tend to be 
quick reactions to terrorism, even when the attackers themselves are not alleged to have used 
encryption or anonymity to plan or carry out an attack'.40 Extra-judicial mass surveillance 
programs of intelligence agencies, which would have been scrutinized and criticized by the 
public in normal times,41 can be introduced in order to identify so-called 'terrorists'. Regimes 
can abandon established legal procedures and human rights protections such as 'the burden 
32 Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics The Social Construction of Deviance, second 
edition, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
33 Ibid, 37.
34 R D King and G M Sutton, 'High Times for Hate Crime: Explaining the Temporal Clustering of Hate 
Motivated Offending,' Criminology 51 (2013), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.12022.
35 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics The Social Construction of Deviance, 37.
36 Ibid, 38.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, 41. Emphasis in original.
39 Ibid.
40 UN Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye,' 13.
41 The UNHRC Special Rapporteur highlights that it is critical to have a 'transparent public debate' 
over privacy restrictions and intrusions. See para 35 of the 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye.'
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of proof' or 'right to a fair trial' in pursuit of punishing political enemies. The oppression of 
dissidents can be facilitated by metadata abuse for political purposes i.e. citing unlawfully 
accessed or unreliable communications metadata to confer guilt on dissidents. To illustrate 
the oppressive potentials of such metadata abuse, I will look at the reactions to the coup 
attempt in Turkey, and the mass ByLock prosecutions in the aftermath.
The Turkish Coup Attempt and the Subsequent Purge
On 15 July 2016, a rogue group in the Turkish military took to the streets to topple President 
Erdogan. The coup had little chance of success: only a marginally small fraction of the Turkish 
military was involved,42 and there was very little public support. While over two hundred sol-
diers and civilians were killed during the clashes, no government official was apprehended. By 
the morning, those involved in the coup were arrested and the coup attempt was suppressed. 
President Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (henceforth AKP) ministers 
publicly announced that the coup was organized by the GM, a social and religious movement 
who were at odds with the AKP at the time.43 Erdogan personally called the attempt a 'gift 
from the God (sic)' which would 'allow him to cleanse the army and the state of terrorists [i.e. 
perceived GM supporters]'.44 On the other hand, Gulen publicly denied any connection to the 
coup attempt, and called for an international commission to investigate the attempt; further 
42 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Turkey: The Attempted Coup and Its Troubling 
Aftermath,' Strategic Comments 22.5 (2016): v-vii, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2016.12170
82.
43 Space precludes a lengthier explanation of the fallout between the GM and AKP, but a short summary 
is needed to provide context for the reader. Even before the coup attempt, the GM was under heavy 
state pressure in Turkey. Both AKP and GM are Islam-inspired organisations, but they have categorical 
differences in interpretation. While the AKP is a political party founded by Erdogan and his allies in 
2001 which adheres to nationalism and political Islam, the GM is a civil society organisation founded 
in Turkey in the late 1960s by the now-US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen, which prefers a 
civil interpretation of Islam with an emphasis on education. In terms of supporters, AKP is the largest 
party in Turkey with half of the popular vote (roughly 23 out of 46 million), the official number of GM 
sympathisers is unknown but estimates put it around 200,000-300,000. The GM used to run more than 
2000 education facilities such as primary schools, high schools, and universities in Turkey, all of which 
have been confiscated by the AKP government. The GM runs more than a thousand education facilities 
outside Turkey in more than 100 countries. Despite being on good terms for nearly a decade since the 
AKP first won plurality in the 2002 legislative elections, the GM and AKP started diverging after 2012 
over political disagreements. AKP accused GM of infiltrating state organs and forming a 'parallel state' 
i.e. having too many influential followers in state positions. The GM dismissed this criticism by arguing 
this was natural given that it provided good education to pupils in its institutions. When prosecutors in 
Istanbul opened Turkey's largest corruption investigations to date in late 2013, incriminating an Iranian-
Turkish gold trader Reza Zarrab and Erdogan's son along with four cabinet ministers and their sons with 
credible evidence, Erdogan called the corruption investigation a 'judicial coup' and publicly declared 
GM as 'public enemy number one'. Media organisations affiliated with the GM ran stories defending the 
corruption probes and individuals representing GM started criticising AKP government vocally. From 
this point on, GM started facing a crackdown in Turkey. Just months before July 2016, the GM was 
declared a terrorist organisation by authorities and individuals allegedly linked to the movement started 
being arrested on terrorism charges.
44 Marc Pierini, 'Turkey's Gift From God' Carnegie Europe, 2017, http://carnegieeurope.eu/
strategiceurope/?fa=67826.
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stating that if any of his sympathizers were involved, they would have violated his values.45 
The extent of GM-linked individuals' possible involvement in the coup attempt is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. However, it is clear that following the coup attempt, GM faced extreme 
stigmatization from Turkish society both inside and outside Turkey, 46 leading GM members 
to leave Turkey for other countries and seek safety abroad.47
In the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, the AKP government launched an unprece-
dented purge against perceived Gulenists. One day after the coup attempt, more than 2700 
judges were dismissed,48 and many were later arrested.49 Even though the coup attempt was 
suppressed within hours, AKP government declared a state of emergency (henceforth SoE) 
and derogated from European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The derogation notice listed derogations from 
13 articles such as the right to liberty, security, fair trial, privacy, the humane treatment of 
detainees, and the right to remedy, the latter two of which cannot be subject to derogation 
under any circumstances, according to the UN Human Rights Committee.50 Additionally, 
the SoE allowed the AKP government to pass decrees without parliamentary scrutiny. For 
instance, SoE decrees provided full financial, administrative and criminal impunity to state 
officials for their actions during the SoE, which resulted in frequent torture and ill-treatment of 
detainees,51 mass arbitrary arrests, arbitrary dismissal of state employees, and the removal of 
due process.52 Consequently, dismissals have extended to perceived critics from other political 
backgrounds such as leftists, human rights defenders and Kurdish politicians. According to 
the latest figures,53 more than 170,000 civil servants, including academics, teachers, police 
and military officers have been dismissed from their jobs without due process,54 with 142,874 
45 Emre Celik, 'Fethullah Gülen: 'I Call For An International Investigation Into The Failed Putsch In 
Turkey' Huffington Post, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/emre-celik/fethullah-guelen-i-call-
f_b_11480974.html.
46 David Tittensor, 'The Gülen Movement and Surviving in Exile: The Case of Australia', Politics, Religion & 
Ideology 19.1 (2018): 123-38, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2018.1453272.
47 Liza Dumovich, 'Pious Creativity: Negotiating Hizmet in South America after July 2016', Politics, 
Religion and Ideology 19.1 (2018): 81-94, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2018.1453267.
48 This number later climbed over 4200 which amounts to one third of the total judges and prosecutors in 
Turkey.
49 Harry Cockburn, 'Turkey Coup: 2,700 Judges Removed from Duty Following Failed Overthrow Attempt' 
The Independent, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-latest-news-
erdogan-istanbul-judges-removed-from-duty-failed-government-overthrow-a7140661.html.
50 United Nations Human Rights Committee, 'International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - 
General Comment No. 29', Annual Review of Population Law 44470.29 (2001): 8, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5_533.
51 Human Rights Watch, 'A BLANK CHECK: Turkey's Post-Coup Suspension of Safeguards Against 
Torture', 2016, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/turkey1016_web.pdf.
52 Erol Önderoglu, 'Turkey: State of Emergency State of Arbitrary', Reporters Without Borders, (September, 
2016): 15, https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/turquie.etatdurgence.eng_.def_.pdf.
53 When I submitted the first draft of this chapter, the figures were 150,000 dismissed, 133,257 detained, 
64,998 arrested. By the time I submitted the second draft, the figures increased to over 170,000 
dismissed, 142,874 detained, 81,417 arrested. These figures alone should be enough to illustrate the 
severity and arbitrary nature of the purge.
54 Amnesty International, 'NO END IN SIGHT: Purged Public Sector Workers Denied a Future in Turkey,' 
2017, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4462722017ENGLISH.PDF.
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people detained and 81,417 people arrested.55 These negative legislative and judicial devel-
opments have been demonstrated to be disproportionate, in breach of Article 4(1) of ICCPR,56 
and have had an extremely negative impact on the rule of law and individual liberties in Turkey.
In parallel with the regressive judicial and legislative developments, exploiting public concern 
and social tensions in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, pro-AKP media and influential 
AKP figures constructed a 'Gulenist' narrative: covert terrorists and plotters infiltrated into 
society and the state, trying to demolish the state from within. Anyone suspected of being a 
GM member, supporter or sympathizer is a traitor and a terrorist. In this context, any activities 
performed by GM-affiliated individuals, such as charity work, donations, working in GM-linked 
institutions, organizing religious meetings or even simply communicating with each other have 
been ostracized and criminalized. This was exacerbated by Erdogan's presidential pleas for 
spying on family members and friends who are suspected to be Gulenists and reporting them 
to authorities.57 Drawing on moral panic theory, we can see that the coup attempt has acted 
as a trigger event and the GM have been effectively declared the folk devils -'a category of 
people who, presumably, engage in evil practices and are blamed for menacing a society's 
culture, way of life, and central values' in the aftermath.58 AKP government took advantage of 
public concern in the aftermath of the coup attempt aimed to construct a narrative to achieve 
consensus of hostility against GM. This was followed by disproportionate social, legislative, 
and judicial reactions. In this volatile social and political environment, it was relatively easy 
for the AKP government to weaken the established legal norms and individual safeguards 
their political enemies. It is fair to argue that, rather than the coup attempt, it was the AKP 
government's exorbitant and vindictive reactions to the coup attempt which resulted in mass 
human rights breaches, the eradication of the rule of law and individual liberties in Turkey.
ByLock Prosecutions: Mass Arrest of Perceived Opponents on 
Terrorism Charges over Encrypted App Usage
ByLock prosecutions were built on inaccurate claims and proceeded with disrespect to estab-
lished legal standards and individual protections. Shortly after the coup attempt, AKP-linked 
media outlets published stories that coup plotters and their supporters communicated over 
ByLock during the coup attempt.59 However, this claim is false, as Fox-IT clearly illustrated 
that the Bylock.net domain was deactivated in March 2016, hence ByLock 'could not have 
been used in the period from April 2016 leading up to 15 July 2016'.60 The Turkish gov-
55 Turkey Purge, 'Turkey Purge | Monitoring Human Rights Abuses in Turkey's Post-Coup Crackdown,' 
2018, https://turkeypurge.com/.
56 Ignatius Yordan Nugraha, 'Human Rights Derogation during Coup Situations', International Journal of 
Human Rights 22.2 (2018): 194-206, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1359551.
57 Laura Pitel, 'Erdogan's Informers: Turkey's Descent into Fear and Betrayal,' The Financial Times, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/6af8aaea-0906-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b.
58 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics The Social Construction of Deviance, 2.
59 Haber7.com, 'Darbeciler ByLock'tan Bu Mesajı Gönderdi! [English: Putchists Sent This Message 
on Bylock],' 2016, http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/2144267-darbeciler-bylocktan-bu-mesaji-
gonderdi.
60 Fox-IT, 'Expert Witness Report on ByLock Investigation,' 9.
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ernment also claimed that MIT identified ByLock user lists using 'special cyber methods' 
i.e. hacking Baltic/Cherry Servers in Lithuania which were hosting the ByLock app.61 This 
means that MIT's access to ByLock server data was unlawful and such unlawfully acquired 
data 'shall not be presented before a court' and 'shall not constitute a factual ground for a 
possible conviction' under Turkish criminal law.62 Both Lithuanian authorities63 and Baltic/
Cherry Servers64 declared that they neither received a legal request from nor shared data 
with Turkish authorities, confirming Gokce's unlawful access observation. This is especially 
egregious because the ByLock prosecutions, which led to the arrest of tens of thousands 
of perceived GM members, were built on communication (meta)data accessed unlawfully.
Once the ByLock prosecutions started, MIT submitted a 'ByLock technical report' to trial 
courts, and this report constituted the technical basis of ByLock prosecutions.65 The MIT 
report claimed that ByLock: (1) offered strong cryptography; (2) was disguised as a global 
application (i.e. presenting itself deceptively as a global application while the aim was to 
provide GM with an intra-organizational communication app); (3) was aimed at security and 
anonymity; (4) used a self-signed certificate; (5) offered communication only suitable for a 
cell-structure (as ByLock did not ask for a phone number to register, MIT argued that ByLock 
users could only exchange ByLock contact details after initially meeting face-to-face); (6) was 
designed to prevent access in case of legal confiscation; (7) offered identity hiding features 
(such as an automatic self-destruct, using long passwords features); and thus, concluded 
that 'ByLock has been offered to the exclusive use of the 'FTÖ/PDY' members [Gulenists]'.66 
Citing this report amongst evidence, first instance courts sentenced thousands of alleged 
ByLock users on terrorism charges (over alleged links to GM), ranging from 6 to 15 years.67 
The court of cassation, which acts as the unifying court of appeals in criminal prosecutions in 
Turkey, approved the evidential status of the alleged ByLock usage,68 permitting the collective 
punishment of alleged ByLock users based on dubious lists created by MIT.
Despite the grave consequences for alleged ByLock users, the MIT report was found to be 
biased, insubstantial and unreliable when scrutinized by the Dutch cyber security firm Fox-IT.69 
61 Gokce, 'The Bylock Fallacy: An In-Depth Analysis of the Bylock Investigations in Turkey,' 2.
62 Gokce, 3.
63 EN.DELFI, 'Lithuania Didn't Provide Turkey with ByLock User Data - Lithuania - m.En.Delfi.Lt,' 2017, 
http://m.en.delfi.lt/lithuania/article.php?id=76099973.
64 Gokce, 'The Bylock Fallacy: An In-Depth Analysis of the Bylock Investigations in Turkey.'
65 Although this report was not released to the public, it was distributed widely on social media. Fox-IT 
released the MIT report along with their own condemning report unpicking the inconsistencies and 
even deliberate manipulations in the former. Readers can find the Turkish version of the MIT report 
here: https://foxitsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/bylock-mit-technical-report-turkish.pdf.
66 Fox-IT, 'Expert Witness Report on ByLock Investigation,' 20.
67 The relevant article is Turkish Penal Code 314/2. See https://www.legislationline.org/download/action/
download/id/6453/file/Turkey_CC_2004_am2016_en.pdf, p. 104.
68 Reporters Without Borders, 'Journalists in New Wave of Arrests in Turkey,' 2017, https://rsf.org/en/
news/journalists-new-wave-arrests-turkey.
69 Fox-IT illustrates tens of factual errors, irregularities, questionable and incorrect claims, and biased 
statements in MIT's technical report but space precludes the inclusion of all points illustrated. Fox-IT's 
report is so damning that it calls MIT's credibility in general into question.
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By reverse engineering ByLock app's source code and online fact-checking, Fox-IT addressed 
claims put forward in the MIT report and found that: (1) 'security measures implemented in 
ByLock are not exceptional and actually on par with widely used chat applications';70(2) the 
disguise of global application argument is 'not backed by evidence, questionable or incor-
rect';71(3) ByLock developer's aim for security and anonymity 'does not imply an intent for 
use in illegal activities',72 and 'in no way an indication that ByLock is aimed at a specific user 
group';73(4) the incentive behind using a self-signed certificate is not necessarily to prevent 
authorities accessing the ByLock data, as self-signed certificates 'are easier to implement and 
are free of cost'; (5) rather than meeting face-to-face, users could have exchanged ByLock 
details using another communication method (e g. WhatsApp, Facebook, phone call), casting 
a shadow over MIT's 'ByLock was designed for communications in a cell structure argument'; 
(6) MIT is 'jumping to conclusions on the intent of the developer' when concluding ByLock 
was designed to 'prevent access in case of legal confusion';74 and (7) measures such as 
self-destruct and using long passwords is a common feature also found in other commu-
nication applications such as Snapchat and Signal. As a result, Fox-IT concluded that MIT 
report is 'biased towards a predefined outcome', 'does not adhere to forensic principles', and 
is 'fundamentally flawed due to the contradicted and unfounded findings, lack of objectivity 
and lack of transparency'.75
MIT report also raised serious doubts about the integrity of data cited as evidence in ByLock 
prosecutions. Fox-IT noted that it is impossible to verify whether MIT tempered with ByLock 
server data or not because MIT did not calculate 'cryptographic hashes' of server data and 
did not 'generate an audit trail'.76 Given that MIT is reported to have hacked ByLock servers, 
this is a crucial point that casts a great doubt over the evidential status of ByLock server 
data cited in prosecutions. In fact, screenshots used in the MIT report detailing the so-called 
investigation of the server data contain multiple inconsistencies 'that indicate manipulation of 
results and/or screenshots by MIT'.77 In Figure 1, Gokce illustrates that the SQL query result 
screenshots presented in the MIT report (allegedly from data acquired from ByLock servers) 
are deliberately manipulated by MIT which 'points out the great likelihood that MIT and other 
Turkish authorities manipulated the Bylock database and fabricated false Bylock records'.78
70 Fox-IT, 'Expert Witness Report on ByLock Investigation,' 25.
71 Fox-IT, 20.
72 Fox-IT, 20.
73 Fox-IT, 25.
74 Fox-IT, 21.
75 Fox-IT, 28.
76 Fox-IT, 8.
77 Fox-IT, 29.
78 Gokce, 'The Bylock Fallacy: An In-Depth Analysis of the Bylock Investigations in Turkey,' 10.
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Figure 1: Screenshots from MIT report, allegedly from ByLock database. Total numbers of rows returned 
by the SQL queries (7 and 10 respectively) do not match total numbers of rows shown at the bottom of 
the query results (8 and 12 respectively). Figure taken from Gokce (2018).
Although manipulation of evidence is a serious claim, Gokce makes a compelling argument 
that other not only MIT but also other Turkish authorities may also have 'fabricated' com-
munications metadata (internet traffic records) to facilitate the sentencing of alleged ByLock 
users.79 MIT report claimed ByLock users were identified by acquiring IP address logs from 
the ByLock server database, but it omits methods used to attribute these IP addresses to 
individuals. During criminal proceedings, it was revealed that the state relied on internet 
traffic metadata - namely IAL which contain information about date/time, public and private 
IP address of the user, target IP of the server connected amongst others - as evidence to 
identify individuals who communicated with ByLock's servers.80 In Turkey, IAL are retained 
by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (Bilgi Teknolojileri Kurumu 
in Turkish, henceforth BTK) which is the government institution authorized to collect and 
store metadata provided from ISPs and MNOs, which are private companies. In one scathing 
example of metadata fabrication, Gokce presents an alleged ByLock user's mobile IAL, which 
was exhibited to a criminal court during proceedings.81 While the IAL produced by the MNO 
contains no data in the 'target IP' column for the specified time frame, the IAL produced 
by the BTK lists ByLock server's IP address in the 'target IP' column for the specified time 
79 Gokce, 7.
80 The Arrested Lawyers Initiative, 'Ever-Changing Evidence ByLock: Turkish Government's Favourite Tool 
to Arrest Its Critics,' 2017, 14, https://arrestedlawyers.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/bylock_report_by_
the_arrested_lawyers.pdf.
81 Gokce, 'The Bylock Fallacy: An In-Depth Analysis of the Bylock Investigations in Turkey,' 9.
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frame. As BTK can only store metadata provided by MNOs and ISPs, one would expect no 
variation between IAL from BTK and MNO over the same time frame. Given this, the fact 
that only the IAL provided by BTK had 'target IP' information (i.e. IP addresses of servers 
hosting the ByLock app) indicates metadata manipulation and/or injection on BTK's side. 
This is a crucial point that lends support for Gokce's 'BTK doctored internet traffic records 
it received from telecommunication companies' argument.82 These, coupled with the fact 
that Turkish authorities reduced the reported total number of ByLock users arbitrarily,83 led 
critics to suggest that Turkish authorities have altered ByLock user lists arbitrarily to target 
perceived GM supporters. 84
Even if we were to set aside claims of metadata manipulation, citing communications meta-
data as evidence in criminal prosecutions is unreliable because of IP-based attribution chal-
lenges. Without corroborating offline evidence, using IP addresses alone to identify individuals 
that are suspected for a crime is unreliable.85 This issue is more frequently observed for 
mobile device IPs which connect to internet over a network provided by MNOs. Around the 
world, 92% of MNOs use Carrier Grade Network Address Translation (CGNAT),86 which are 
network designs that distribute a small number of global IP addresses to many private users. 
This means, same public IP address can be shared by hundreds of users at a particular time, 
making it almost impossible to identify individual users via communications metadata. Indeed, 
EUROPOL reported that '90% of European cybercrime investigators regularly encounter attri-
bution problems related to CGN technologies'.87 Similarly, Turkish MNOs use CGNAT, which 
makes attempts to identify alleged ByLock users using communications metadata exception-
ally error prone. In addition, individuals might have relied on 'Good Data' practices - such 
as using a VPN, a proxy server or Tor - to hide their IP addresses.88 This makes attribution 
of ByLock usage based on communications metadata significantly unreliable. Furthermore, 
handing down lengthy prison sentences to individuals based on such unreliable metadata 
as evidence is likely to amount to a miscarriage of justice.
82 Gokce, 10.
83 The Arrested Lawyers Initiative, 'Ever-Changing Evidence ByLock: Turkish Government's Favourite Tool 
to Arrest Its Critics.'
84 Turkish Minister of Science and Technology first argued to have identified 215,000 ByLock users in 
September 2016. Then, in April 2017, AKP-linked media reported that the number of ByLock users 
had decreased to 102,000. In December 2017, Ankara Chief Prosecutor's Office announced over 
11,000 misidentifications in ByLock lists, decreasing the final number to just over 90,000. Furthermore, 
the prosecution did not share digital data/evidence with defendants and their counsel. This led critics 
to suspect 'fabrication, alteration or corruption of the data' used in ByLock trials. See: The Arrested 
Lawyers Initiative report for an extensive summary.
85 Aaron Mackey, Seth Schoen, and Cindy Cohn, 'Unreliable Informants: IP Addresses, Digital Tips and 
Police Raids. How Police and Courts Are Misusing Unreliable IP Address Information and What They 
Can Do to Better Verify Electronic Tips', Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2016, https://www.eff.org/
files/2016/09/22/2016.09.20_final_formatted_ip_address_white_paper.pdf.
86 Philipp Richter et al, 'A Multi-Perspective Analysis of Carrier-Grade NAT Deployment,' IMC '16 
Proceedings of the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference, 2016: 223, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1145/2987443.2987474.
87 Europol, 'IOCTA 2016: Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment' (The Hague, 2016), 58, DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.2813/275589.
88 Mackey, Schoen, and Cohn, 'Unreliable Informants: IP Addresses, Digital Tips and Police Raids'.
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In their report scrutinizing the Bylock prosecutions and the legality of actions of the Turkish 
state following the coup attempt, British criminal lawyers Clegg and Baker illustrated four 
significant breaches of the ECHR. First, alleged ByLock use does not satisfy the require-
ment of the ECHR Article 5:1(c)[reasonable suspicion of having committed and offence] 
and therefore, 'detention of persons on the basis that they had downloaded the Bylock App 
use is arbitrary and in breach of Article 5 of the convention [right to liberty and security]'.89 
Second, the MIT report is a clear breach of Article 6(3)(d) [right to examine or have exam-
ined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on 
his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him], because 'authors of [the 
MIT] report are not identified' and 'no questions can be asked to the authors of the report'.90 
Third, mass dismissal and arrest of members of judiciary 'strikes at the heart of judicial 
independence and appears to be a further clear breach of Article 6 [the right to a fair trial]'.91 
Lastly, since both membership of GM and use of the ByLock app was legal before the coup 
attempt, to convict persons of membership of a terrorist organization on alleged ByLock use 
is 'clearly retrospective criminality and a clear breach of Article 7'.92 The Turkish regime's 
breaches of the ECHR in the aftermath of the coup attempt - despite being a signatory of 
the ECHR - demonstrates that supranational human rights legislation may be ineffective to 
prevent metadata abuses by states. In the context of unlawful access and metadata retention 
debates, this means that 'broad mandatory [meta]data retention policies'93 and 'A priori [meta]
data retention or collection'94 capabilities of states leave dissidents and political enemies of 
the states extremely vulnerable.
Lessons from the ByLock Case: Good Data Practices
In this chapter, by critically engaging with the ByLock prosecutions I detailed the material 
effects of metadata exploitation for political purposes outside of doctrinal analyses. This case 
study contributes to the metadata retention and lawful access debates, demonstrating both 
how existing capabilities of DCTs can be abused, and how extrajudicial - even illegal - inves-
tigative techniques can be introduced to oppress dissidents. Authoritarian governments like 
Turkey can and/or will take advantage of moral panics following political upheavals. 'Bad 
data' practices such as unlawful access and large-scale (meta)data retention and (meta)data 
manipulation can be instrumental to confer criminality on dissidents and political enemies, as 
observed in the ByLock case. Although regimes frequently spy on and surveil dissidents and 
89 William Clegg and Simon Baker, 'Opinion on the Legality of the Actions of the Turkish State in the 
Aftermath of the Failed Coup Attempt in 2016 and the Reliance on Use of the Bylock App as Evidence 
of Membership of a Terrorist Organisation', London, 2017, 24, http://2oq5cg28288838bmfu32g94v-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Redacted-Opinion.pdf.
90 Clegg and Baker, 25.
91 Clegg and Baker, 26.
92 Clegg and Baker, 28.
93 UN Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye,' 19.
94 Amie Stepanovich and Drew Mitnick, 'Universal Implementation Guide for the International Principles 
on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance,' Access Now, 2015, 41, https://
www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/archive/docs/Implementation_guide_-_July_10_print.pdf.
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activists in normal times, moral panics certainly help regimes to justify unlawful, extrajudicial 
even illegal measures - such as criminalizing encryption usage - that would have been harder 
to implement in normal times.
Even though the scale and scope of mass arbitrary arrest of dissidents in the ByLock pros-
ecutions are unprecedented, the threat of (meta)data abuse is not unique to dissidents in 
authoritarian regimes like Turkey. As metadata are being collected in 'bulk' globally, the very 
availability of metadata can be tempting for states to surveil dissidents, minority populations, 
activists, whistleblowers and government critics. On the other hand, although supranational 
human rights legislation and supranational judicial mechanisms have provided a degree 
of protection for human rights, their effectiveness in the face of oppression is questionable. 
Despite being a signatory of ECHR and a member of ECtHR, the Turkish regime has sig-
nificantly breached the ECHR without facing any significant repercussions since the failed 
coup attempt. The mass human rights breaches observed in Turkey in the aftermath of the 
coup attempt call the credibility of supranational judicial mechanisms into question. Regimes 
can simply ignore or suspend the supranational judicial legislation citing perceived or even 
imagined national security concerns, as observed in the ByLock case. Given the possibility 
of the further rise of more authoritarian regimes in previously liberal countries, this case may 
be a grim precedent for things to come.
The ByLock case illustrates how critical 'Good Data' principles and the integrity of encrypted 
and secure communication channels are for 'Good Democracy'. In the age of DCTs, in order to 
exercise fundamental human rights - such as the freedom of speech, the freedom of political 
thought, the freedom of religion, and the freedom of association - strong and secure encrypted 
communications are essential. If we are not mindful and do not uphold, promote and defend 
'Good Data' principles - whether they be more comprehensive and practical human rights 
legislation or technological solutions such as encrypted communications and anonymization 
tools - globally, regimes can and will compromise DCTs for 'bad' purposes, and the conse-
quences for dissidents and governments critics are severe, as observed in the ByLock case. 
Therefore, we should remember that the ultimate promise of the 'Good Data' principles are 
not staying outside states' surveillance nets or communicating secretly; it is democracy itself.
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